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Richard Lewis: The West and Russia: Does the Way Forward Point North? 
(Under the direction of Donald D. Searing) 
 This thesis proposes two methods by which the West can achieve a peaceful and 
cooperative outcome in the Arctic. As sea ice continues to recede, the northern reaches of the 
globe open to increased shipping, military presence, oil and precious mineral extraction, fishing 
and other opportunities. These opportunities represent potential cooperation or competition 
between interested parties, to include Russia. Realists argue that conflict is inevitable, but there 
already exists reason to hope for a more peaceful reality. By suggesting a new perspective on the 
NATO alliance and what it takes to secure ocean shipping and the vulnerable environment in a 
collaborative way, this thesis seeks to determine a cooperative path with benefits extending far 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 The tensions rising between the Russian Federation and the West peaked in 2014 with the 
annexation of Crimea and state support of separatist violence in eastern Ukraine. Since then, 
Russian forces have taken an active role in the Syrian civil war and state agents allegedly 
poisoned Russian ex-spies with a nerve agent on foreign soil. As implacable as the Federation 
seems to be while antagonizing the West and eschewing liberal values, the West has taken an 
opposing stance of similar resolve via a coordinated sanctions regime and other soft power 
means. How does the international community span this widening chasm? In answer, this thesis 
seeks to trace a path forward capable of improving relations as well as establishing a more secure 
environment in one of the most vulnerable geographic regions of the globe: the Arctic. This 
paper begins by ‘laying the groundwork’ of relations as they currently exist between the two 
opposing sides through the perspective of the current sanctions system. Afterwards, a brief 
overview describes what is occurring in the emerging environment of the Arctic regions and why 
it matters. Finally, the author analyzes two key organizations closely associated with the 
developing dynamic: NATO and the Arctic Council. By examining these two entities, it may be 
possible to make necessary changes to the utilization of both institutions in order to address 
current grievances and ensure a more cooperative future between these historic adversaries.  
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
international community has found itself operating within an entirely new framework. Formally 
a bipolar world, consisting of the USSR and the United States as global heavyweights, the 
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dissolution of one entity left a massive power vacuum which the US found itself filling. 
However, since 2001, the world’s first true superpower is met with myriad challenges to both its 
hegemony and interests abroad. The Russian Federation often centers itself at the crux of many 
of these challenges in some form or another and the Putin administration in Moscow appears to 
push the boundaries of acceptable action on a regular basis. As a result, old friction points 
established since 1945 have found themselves imbued with new life. However, the stage upon 
which the actors find themselves has changed significantly since the days of proxy conflicts and 
Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, theory. Though these ingredients certainly play a role 
today, the environment within which they interact provides a different setting than was present 
during the Cold War’s more tense moments.   
 Despite improvements in relations since Soviet rule, recent years reveal a growing chasm 
between the Russian Federation and the West. Symptoms of this regression appear in the news 
with fair prominence and frequency. On the surface, much of this dynamic seems based on the 
perceived misbehavior of Russia in some sector or another, such as oil supply strangulation to 
countries reliant on the Federation’s resources, the use of performance enhancing substances in 
international sports events, or hostile takeovers of private domestic companies by the 
government. Following such activities, the West tends to respond through sanctions or 
diplomatic means. It is through this tit-for-tat dynamic that the current situation between the two 
seemingly opposed sides must be analyzed first in order to establish the current working 
environment. Understanding the events which have largely defined relations between these two 




 It is important to note at this juncture certain terminologies utilized throughout the paper. 
As is already evident, the usage of the term ‘the West’ is used to signify the collection of nation-
states opposed in many ways to the activities carried out by the Russian Federation. For clarity’s 
sake, this nomenclature will refer to the US, Canadian and EU-states united in their use of 
sanctions to enforce change within the Russian political system. It would make little sense, for 
instance, to include Australia or New Zealand within this entity as much of what will be 
discussed refers to actions relegated to the northern hemisphere. This requirement for 
clarification is essential as the West represents not only the ‘senders’ of sanctions but also the 
coalition with which the Russian Federation contends within the specific geo-spatial realm 
chosen for analysis.  
 Another important term to discuss here is what precisely we mean when referencing ‘the 
Arctic’. Descending southwards from the North Pole at the northernmost part of the Earth, the 
latitudinal rings expand until the cartographic boundary referred to as the Arctic Circle is 
reached. This line, situated at 66˚33’N, includes portions of eight Arctic states: Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States 
(Spohr et al., 2013). The largest portion of this shared political ‘boundary’ of the Arctic is 
consumed by Russia. This presents the central issue of concern from the West’s perspective as 
well as the source of potential opportunity afforded by this area of the globe. 
  This paper seeks to establish the current relationship between these two political entities 
first. By doing so, the present dynamic can be understood before assumptions and analysis of 
activities and future efforts occur. Historical relations between nations present a wide array of 
potential focus points. For the purposes of this work, the lens through which the modern-day 
relationship is examined will be the sanctions regime. This illustrates the current restrictions and 
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onerous penalties enacted against the Russian state which may need to be overcome if relations 
are to become normalized in the future. Once the dynamics of soft power tension between these 
two sides is established, recent developments within the Arctic domain receive attention.  
This geographic area of focus has been chosen for several reasons. First and foremost, the 
developing situation in the Arctic is relatively new. Much of what occurs there is happening for 
the first time within modern contexts. Second, the developments there change constantly as the 
operating environment itself alters due to natural and man-made effects. Shifting realities within 
this part of the globe pose strategic implications for all Arctic bodies politic. Third, the Arctic 
presents a unique environment, perhaps as unique as space exploration, with opportunities 
present for both Russia and the Western nations involved in its development, exploitation, and 
growing viability as a route of commerce.  
Through analyzing this case study, the observer is presented with a special scenario 
wherein new attempts for cooperation become feasible in an area with little history of past 
grievances to encumber such future efforts. Alternatively, this unique portion of the globe 
provides a new arena wherein the pursuit of realist goals rules the motivations of the more 
aggressive states among the Arctic nations. The emergence of the Arctic as a viable realm of 
influence and material gain forces us to contend with issues ranging from the treatment of 
indigenous peoples to the impact of humanity upon the global environment.  These matters of 
concern require imminent and necessary address as one of the most historically hostile parts of 
the globe reluctantly relinquishes its ice-bound hold of the far northerly reaches.  
 The question posited by the author and answered by the conclusion of this thesis is 
whether or not the Arctic provides an opportunity for cooperation. If so, how should the 
international community proceed in establishing improved relations between Russia and the 
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nations currently taking soft power stances against it? Obviously, this is not a comprehensive 
prescription for the most correct answer, but it may provide touchstones enabling a path towards 
peaceful and cooperative efforts. Furthermore, the possibility of positive second and third order 
effects from such a path should only heighten interest in this region of the world and the steps 
taken over the next decade. Given the current status quo of globalized economies and societies, 
interconnected tourism and commerce, and liberal institutions such as the UN, there exist many 
inroads for improved relations. It behooves us to explore these methods and mechanisms to 
achieve desired outcomes beneficial to the Earth and its inhabitants.  
 Admittedly, a measure of ‘improved relations’ is hard to quantify. However, there are 
indicators of improvement addressed in this paper. A complete lifting of sanctions would, for 
example, provide an indication of warmer ties between the West and the Russian federation. But 
improvement does not mean cure and suggests a gradual becoming rather than an instantaneous 
transition. Therefore, a key assumption within this thesis posits that a total easing of sanctions or 
a complete and rapid turnaround in relations is not required to achieve the end result sought by 
the author. However, such elements as sanctions would ostensibly be under re-evaluation were 
the West to observe significant inroads towards the implementation of internationally recognized 
norms by the Federation. Russia, as well, would likely perform a recalibration of its antagonist 
methods in the light of such a development. 
An admitted weakness in assessing the situation as a whole is the author’s lack of fluency 
in Russian. This certainly presents a limiting factor within this paper as no Russian literature in 
its un-translated form is utilized. This gap in coverage will hopefully be addressed by future 
research and published work carried out by those familiar with both English and Russian 




 The Arctic region and its changing landscape enjoy relatively little attention compared to 
other strategic mainland or oceanic concerns. This is understandable for a number of reasons as 
this particular zone poses hazards to maritime travel to this day and, outside of the climate 
change debate, does not receive significant attention within mainstream media feeds at present. 
Much of this dearth in coverage stems from the relative newness of the subject matter in 
question. One is hard pressed to identify substantial discussion about this part of the world from 
a security or economic standpoint prior to 2007. With the vast majority of coverage found within 
the last fifteen years, it is little wonder that the topic is not as represented as other areas of 
international relations.  
The symbolic planting of the Russian flag under the Arctic sea ice in 2007 forced the 
world to take serious notice of the geopolitical implications of what claims to the northern 
reaches might mean in a post-colonial world for the first time (Haftendorn, 2011; Borgerson, 
2018; Ananyeva, 2019). Oil fields have long been discovered under the sea bed and onshore, but 
ice and permafrost rendered methods of procuring these natural resources too expensive to be 
viable until recent rising temperatures began to pave the way to access possibilities (Palmer & 
Croasdale, 2013). Much of the literature devoted to the High North, consists of NATO security 
postures and wealth acquisition via resource exploitation. Furthermore, much of what is 
discussed in academic writing presents a world view that is very Western oriented (Burke & 
Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017; Borgerson, 2018).  
Some work has been done to break ground on possible vectors for cooperation. Scott 
Stephenson devotes a significant amount of effort in establishing a link between economic and 
environmental goals through which international designs can merge (2012). By creating shared 
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understanding and mutual agreements, much of the groundwork is laid for establishing additional 
norms and procedures knitting the Arctic nations closer together (Stephenson, 2012). Efforts, 
such as research collaboration, to establish other means of achieving shared purpose in the Far 
North exist as well. However, even these measures are not harmless with regards to the 
perceived balance of power in this part of the world (Pham, 2019). But are these endeavors 
enough? The author submits that this is not the case. A symptom of this reality is the dearth of 
literature capitalizing upon the potential the Artic represents as a method of significantly 
improving relations between nuclear powered adversaries. Such a shortfall makes this thesis all 
the more important and timely. 
A holistic approach must be taken as there exist forces presenting both challenge and 
reassurance. These forces must be addressed if there is to be significant progress towards 
relational stability. Additionally, the perspective of the Russian Federation must be taken into 
account. Aspects of national identity and objectives require coverage in order to understand both 
halves of the equation. There exist several routes to take; however, in the interest of time and 
length, the number of topics analyzed will be limited to two key institutions. First, an analysis of 
NATO and its operations in the Artic region. How can NATO be used or not utilized in order to 
achieve international objectives given Russia’s perspective of the alliance? Second, 
organizations provide vehicles through which values and practices transfer between partners, 
eventually gaining influence and purchase in other, related fields as the ideals of liberalism 
predict. The Arctic Council provides such an entity wherein significant cooperation already 
manifests itself. By guiding these two vectors towards achieving a net-win scenario based on 
cooperation and mutual trust, we may find more success than past efforts have provided.  
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Forging a path towards cooperative efforts within the Arctic, with the ‘trickle-down’ 
effect of reduction of tensions elsewhere, provides an option to disrupt the cycle of action and 
counter-action between the two sides. Arctic exploration and resource extraction, increasing sea 
levels and retracting ice flows pose unique challenges that only the international community can 
hope to address in any meaningful way. Furthermore, current challenges posed by the 
international operating environment constitute timely concerns and include attempts at reduction 
in nuclear arms, prevention of nuclear weapons technology proliferation, stopping international 
terrorism, and a vulnerable world economy. These each demand cooperative solutions rather than 
unilateral approaches. Perhaps the way towards more peaceful relations, mutual prosperity, and a 
broadening of liberal values and acceptable behaviors can be mapped through the Artic. Such 
progression would likely lead to tighter coordination in meeting these global challenges. 
Considering what is at stake, discovering a way to increase trust and reduce tension amongst key 













CHAPTER 2: ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP VIA SANCTIONS 
 It is important to be familiar with recent events if one is to grasp the current situation 
between the two established sides of this adversarial relationship. Despite the long history of 
standoff between what was once the USSR and the West, there appeared a brief period in the 
early and mid-1990s wherein a rapprochement seemed possible. During this window the Soviet 
Union dissolved as a political entity and the Russian Federation was born. However, though 
glasnost and democratization held promise for those seeking peace, the road ahead proved 
difficult. Russia experienced what is sometimes referred to as a ‘triple transition’ (Offe, 1991). 
This triple event included the dissolution of territory and subsequent disruption of networks, both 
political and infrastructure, an extreme political shift, and an economic overhaul focused on 
decentralization of the national economy (Offe, 1991). The disturbance to natural resource 
extraction, logistics and population centers is hard to exaggerate. Perhaps the Russian Federation 
could have successfully navigated any one of these challenges by itself, but this transition 
required speed and simultaneity.  
 Ultimately, the democratization of the Russian Federation would only progress so far. 
Yeltsin’s appointment of Vladimir Putin in 1999 as President, a move then legitimized by 
popular election in 2000, solidified the political shift towards re-centralizing power at the federal 
level (Gelʹman, 2015). The Presidency received broad powers while the legislative branch 
experienced a significant weakening, a trend which continues to this day (Gelʹman, 2015). 
Eventually, the erosion of democratic institutions and values, once so promisingly emergent in 
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the early 90s, gave way to an autocratic regime centered in the Kremlin (Mcfaul, 2018). Whether 
or not the organs of state, with the checks and balances associated with effective democracies, 
work within the Russian Federation is not what this paper seeks to address. Instead, the salient 
point is that today the course of the Russian Federation is largely dictated by the head of 
government. In this case, that consists of Putin and the decisions that he and those he trusts 
make. Recent news from Russia seems to support this view of Federation politics. The lower 
house of the Federation parliament has just passed a measure which could, upon ratification by 
popular vote in April 2020, enable Putin to run for president again in 2024 and 2030 
(Gershkovich, 2020). If this constitutional change passes, his influence on Russia’s trajectory 
would be incalculably significant.  
 Determining Putin’s true motives and objectives may prove impossible even long after 
his reign in Russia comes to an end, and the topic could take up the length of a book. Therefore, 
this thesis will not try to divine such intentions; however, there remain influences appearing time 
and time again in the choices he makes which are impossible to ignore. Putin himself has spent 
much of his life within the intelligence apparatus of the USSR, the notorious KGB, now known 
as the FSB. This dangerous entity, overlapping security and political intention, has long been 
used as a Soviet tool used for maintaining control and seems to have inherited this mission in its 
current form (McFaul, 2018). In 2005, Putin publicly made his feelings known about the current 
world order. Referring to the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe” of the twentieth century and mentioning it as the one historical event he wished he 
could change, it is obvious that he yearns for a status quo of yesteryear (Osborn, 2018). Whether 
that means a return to the days of the tsars, the communist party, or a hybrid of both remains 
unclear. But the implications are obvious, that he believes in a strong leader to bring Russia back 
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from the brink of obscurity to center stage. To make the point even more clear, Putin stated in 
March 2020 that, “the president is a guarantor of security of our state, its internal stability and 
evolutionary development” (Stanglin, 2020). Unfortunately for the democratization of Russia, 
many Russians believe that he is right and, as such, his actions seem legitimately mandated by 
the people (Anon, 2006).  
The brief summary of the current Russian political landscape is vitally important because 
it is essential to understand that Putin’s worldview significantly affects the decisions of the 
Russian state in both foreign and domestic policy. Through his twenty years in power as either 
the prime minister or president, the Russian state ignited controversy abroad through various 
means and to varying degrees of severity. For instance, while doping of athletes is certainly 
important as far as regulatory commissions and interstate trust are concerned, the fallout remains 
largely benign and the results for the international community are negligible at surface level. It 
is, however, important to note that at the height of the Cold War the sporting realm found itself 
an extension of conflict between the Soviet Union and the US. The widespread flouting of the 
rules established by institutions such as the International Olympic Committee by Russian sports 
could very well be another symptom of Russia’s pugnacious attitude towards the West in general 
(Altukhov & Nauright, 2018).  
The malign effects of Moscow’s efforts expanded in recent years well beyond the bounds 
of sporting events. They form a spectrum comprised of aggressive military maneuvers 
threatening sovereign airspace, to assassination, to election meddling with the intent of 
disrupting democratic processes in order to sow discord and confusion abroad (Li, 2019; Anon, 
2017b). Even sovereign borders of states are no stranger to the machinations of Russian designs. 
The incursions into eastern Ukraine, the outright annexation of Crimea, and the military 
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intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia received significant attention in recent years. These 
efforts seem designed to meet several goals of the Russian Federation.  
Among these are the desire to offset Western encroachment, via NATO expansion and 
EU membership, by destabilizing nations facing westward such as was the case with Ukraine and 
Georgia. Russia has also taken on the role of power broker in its ‘near abroad’ in order to tie 
nearby nations into its orbit of influence. Sometimes this is accomplished via peace brokering, 
provision of security, and economic agreements (Ohanyan, 2018). Anna Ohanyan, a professor of 
political science at Stonehill College and author, calls this strategy “regional fracturing” (2018). 
By ‘fracturing’ troubled areas, control can be maintained, resistance undermined, and NATO 
kept out. She goes further to establish Moscow’s goals as twofold: maintain influence in former 
Soviet bloc space and increase Russia’s standing on the world political stage (2018). These tie 
neatly into Putin’s public lamentations about the loss of prestige and power associated with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Regardless of the permutations of motivation, the Kremlin is 
attempting to play the hand dealt by geography, history, and resources to meet as many state 
objectives as possible. 
The combative actions taken by the Russian Federation can be observed from several 
perspectives, more of which will be covered later. However, it remains crucial to note Putin’s 
worldview as the main decider of Russian policy abroad. As will be shown shortly in this 
section, the Federation and the West have both fed into the dichotomy of the Other for quite a 
while. The West, and specifically NATO, is seen as a security threat, who’s perceived aggressive 
maneuvers lead to an action by the Federation to exemplify strength or to increase the 
unassailability of its position. In turn, this motivates the West to take further measures in order to 
maintain the status quo, such as eroding Russian influence in eastern Europe. This represents a 
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simplistic explanation of a complex dance, but the central point remains valid. The resulting 
uncertainty of such maneuvers creates a classic security dilemma wherein balance is never 
achieved between the opposing sides, but is continuously sought (Mitzen, 2006). Furthermore, 
the search for real security, both ontological and physical, can lead to illogical situations. As long 
as the West and the Federation continue along the paths illustrated above, we may find that an 
aggressive and oft-counterproductive relationship between these two entities is not only 
inevitable, but even comforting (Mitzen, 2006). Therefore, this thesis will next outline in greater 
detail how this relationship has played out along the economic fault line of sanctions before 
addressing how to break this destructive cycle.   
The West Acts 
Recent history regarding Russia is filled with examples of confrontation and ‘pushing the 
envelope’ of what is deemed acceptable by the international community. Short of direct military 
conflict, there exist other means of exercising ‘soft power’ in order to achieve desired results 
within a global context. Examples of this tit-for-tat relationship include Western responses to the 
Russian invasion of two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, within the sovereign 
state of Georgia in 2008 and the overwhelming diplomatic response to the Skripal poisoning 
episode in 2018. Condoleezza Rice, the American Secretary of State from 2005 to 2009, stated 
emphatically that not only was the US involved in brokering a peace deal, returning Georgian 
armed forces from supporting the war in Iraq to confront Russian incursions at home but also 
took several steps to enact a sanctions approach against Russian-supported areas of Georgia 
(2018). Following the poisoning of ex-spy, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter with a chemical 
nerve agent on UK soil, many Western nations expelled Russian diplomats by the hundreds from 
their respective positions (Anon, 2018c). Furthermore, the Trump administration enacted strong 
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sanctions against the Russian Federation, specifically with regards to the exports of targeted 
electronic components and other technology-based exports (Anon, 2018c). Prior to this event, the 
US had imposed sanctions on select Russian companies and individuals tied to alleged cyber-
attacks against the United States (Anon, 2018c).  
These events illustrate a pattern of aggression and response from the West, but perhaps 
the most significant coordinated effort to utilize economic clout against the Russian state took 
place following the events which unfolded in 2014. Following the blatant violation of Ukrainian 
sovereignty, the Obama administration took an aggressive stance with the intent of increasing the 
political and economic isolation of Russia, specifically within the realms of defense, finances, 
and energy production (Kazantsev, 2017). Simultaneously, the EU states, Canada, Iceland, and 
Norway, among other nations, instituted sanctions as well. This concerted effort was intended to 
exhibit a unified response against Russia’s actions, uphold international norms, and punish the 
Federation’s leadership economically (Ástvaldsson, 2019; Anon, 2019b).  
In general, sanctions associated with this scenario fall into two categories: those 
associated with the Crimea annexation and those affiliated with the unrest and separatist 
activities in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Sanctions with regard to the Crimean 
Peninsula targeted individuals and entities associated or believed to be associated with the 
annexation process and subsequent human rights violations, mostly by freezing economic assets 
of these identified actors (Connolly, 2018; Anon, 2019b). Further measures included preventing 
investment in Crimea and Sevastopol and enforcing bans on technology sharing and the 
exporting of Crimean goods not officially sanctioned by the Ukrainian government (Connolly, 
2018). In contrast, the sanctions regarding the sponsorship of separatist violence within the 
Donbas region centered on the three broad sectors of defense, energy, and finances; however, 
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these sanctions were not always uniform nor did they target every entity involved in these three 
sectors, with the exception of defense technology sales to Russia from Western sources 
(Connolly, 2018; Anon, 2019b).  
Russia Reacts 
Measuring the success of sanctions is a difficult proposition as the act itself is a multi-
faceted enterprise. From the Western perspective, several motivations for enacting a coordinated 
sanctions regime existed. For one, such cooperative efforts would show a united front to the 
Russian Federation as well as to other nations outside of the West who might consider similar 
actions in the future. However, it should be noted that not even this has been achieved fully as 
cracks in the unity of these nations have recently become apparent (Jackson, 2018). Demonstrating 
a willingness to stand against Russia, despite economic reprisals, would also prove a state’s 
support for the United States, potentially strengthening relationships with the top military and 
economic power (Ástvaldsson, 2019). Obviously, the potential to change the target nation’s 
decision-making process remains throughout this process, but, judging by the continued state of 
the Ukraine situation, it would seem that this has not played out as many had hoped. Whatever the 
main goals and motivations of the sanctioning body, Russia capitalized on this open show of 
economic aggression to consolidate power and continue a standoff narrative, reminiscent of the 
Cold War.  
The ideology centered around Western aggressiveness towards Russia is nothing new. But 
it seems that these recent events breathed new life into the concept. So much so in fact that some 
observers have labeled the current relationship as ‘the new Cold War’ (Legvold, 2014). The history 
of Russia and its long tradition of repelling invaders and resisting outside interference have 
resulted in an interesting mix of desire for influence but also a distrust of the intentions of others 
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(Ross, 2013; Marshall, 2015). Though past security may have involved the acquisition of territorial 
buffer zones and geographic ‘funnels’, contemporary security is much more complicated and 
nuanced. Today, protecting economies, the minds of citizens, elections, and key infrastructure take 
up as much time in security dialogue as territorial integrity ever did. As a recent example, Russian 
Defense Minister, Sergei Soigu, in reaction to a perceived informational assault by the West, stated 
“the main and basic goal of this war is to control Russia and, ultimately, the world” (Anon, 2019c). 
Though Russia may not fear an invasion, it seems that its distrust of the West endures. As alluded 
to, economic security plays a significant role in the overall stability of the state. Given the current 
sanctions regime, the Russian economy received significant attention within Russian national 
strategy after the invasion of Ukraine.  
According to the Russian National Security Strategy for 2016, released in December 2015, 
the West is clearly portrayed as an adversary and the emphasis of counteracting the economic 
damage done by restrictive policies are addressed as a key concern. Paragraph 57 specifically 
mentions the detrimental effects of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, thereby tying the 
continued functionality of the economy directly to national security interests as a whole (RNSS, 
2015). This securitization of economy granted more power to the state in pressing for ‘import 
substitution’. It seems that not all motivation for this economic shift stems from repressive 
sanctions imposed by the Western regime but also from factors associated with the modern 
globalized market economy. For example, due to a recent decrease in global demand of oil and 
natural gas, the main source of the Russian petrostate’s revenue was sharply curtailed as the ruble 
suffered devaluation, forcing the domestic production of goods normally imported from abroad 
(Fal’tsman, 2015).  However, by tying the economy to the security of the state against an outside 
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‘Other’, the reigns of power shift even further to the hands of Moscow as a matter of state 
protection. 
In 2015, the Russian government established the Government Commission on Import 
Substitution as a way to minimize the need for import products from abroad and maximize self-
reliance in key sectors (Anon, 2015). For example, the imports of machinery, vehicles and other 
associated equipment were valued at 158 billion USD in 2015 whereas exports comprised 27 
billion USD (Fal’tsman, 2015). The Commission targeted this sector for substitution efforts. 
Overall, the planned substitution was to include more than 2,000 projects across nineteen branches 
of the economy at a cost of approximately 25 billion USD (Connolly, 2018). The intent was to 
improve the durability of the Russian economy, blunt the effects of sanctions and global market 
fluctuations, specifically in the oil industry, and increase the production capacity of the Russian 
industrial sector. 
The third method of dealing with the sanctions regime has been to diversify its trading 
partners abroad. Though the desire to improve and increase ties to nearby nations is nothing new, 
the emphasis on such a focus has increased since 2014 and focuses heavily on its neighbor, China 
(Lukyanov, 2012; Anishchuk and Heritage, 2013). Closer ties with China, involvement in Latin 
America and the Middle East, and the development of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 
2014 are all evidence testifying to efforts geared towards forging a more resilient economy 
(Connolly, 2018). Russia wishes to increase its pool of active trading partners and free itself from 
becoming overly reliant on the EU or other Western powers for trade and economic interaction 
(Connolly, 2018). This provides Moscow with maneuverability with its partners and how it 
chooses to orient itself on the international stage while, again, insulating itself from Western 
sanctions and increasing its influence regionally, if not globally.  
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 Rather than reacting in a way that makes its foreign and domestic policy decisions 
palatable to the EU and other Western nations, Russia utilizes sanctions and an encroaching 
Western presence as a pretext towards expansion in other areas. These moves suggest a continued 
turning away from the West in favor of a more balanced approach of diversified allies and partners, 
thereby weakening the influence of Western-associated liberal practices and norms. Whether or 
not these diplomatic, economic, and even military-oriented moves will pay off in the long run 
remains to be seen. However, it is unequivocal that Russia has developed a home grown and 
extensive foreign network representing other means of achieving its national policy ends. This 
brief perspective on the contentious relationship between the Federation and the West covers 
essential aspects of process and response, describing the methodology by which Russia maintains 
its economic sovereignty and increases its presence in a way reminiscent of the Cold War. With 
this in mind, it is logical to assume that the Arctic would be impossible to ignore given the growing 
opportunity for natural resource extraction, the possibility for exclusive development access rights, 
and potential influence over what may become an oft-used maritime trade route. The northerly 
reaches provide a golden opportunity for Putin’s Russia to continue down this same path of self-











CHAPTER 3: THE ARCTIC 
 An Accessible Arctic 
 Recent developments north of the Arctic Circle appear to point to the inevitable conclusion 
that the frigid waters, historically capable of keeping shipping or transit of any significance at bay, 
are becoming more accessible every year. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
estimated in 2007 that summers in the Arctic would be ice free by 2070, whereas other estimates 
put that date significantly closer to today (Borgerson, 2013). Between the rising air and sea 
temperatures, we can confidently expect that the flow of traffic through the northerly latitudes will 
increase significantly. Such an increase in accessibility translates to more opportunities for oil 
extraction, potential mining, fishing, and power projection possibilities.  
 Massive physical changes indicate burgeoning trading outcomes. The potential for a 
significant increase in trafficability within the Arctic, via three semi-permanent and permanent 
routes, portends truly revolutionary effects on maritime transit. Nation-states have already begun 
making inroads with ice-capable technology development. China, for instance, has constructed 
two ice-breaker ships and plans to produce more nuclear-powered assets for northerly expeditions 
as it continues its pursuit of a One-Belt initiative linking its economy to further flung parts of the 
globe (Ananyeva, 2019; Martynova, 2019). By cutting significant distance between the EU trading 
bloc and Central and East Asia, coupled with a more politically stable route, the possibility of 
Anchorage, Alaska and Reykjavik, Iceland emerging as the northerly equivalents to such 
commerce hubs as Dubai or Singapore becomes more realistic (Borgerson, 2013). By 2010, four 
20 
 
commercial vessels utilized the Northern Sea Route to transit between western Europe to Northeast 
Asia; by 2012, that number had jumped to 46 (Borgerson, 2013). When considering these factors 
in tandem with the known natural resources situated within these wintry climes, there is little 
wonder as to why the eyes of several nations drift ever northward. With such attention, however, 
comes a litany of considerations.  
 Russian Intentions 
 There appear to be three main schools of thought regarding what is transpiring with regards 
to the development of human activity in the Far North. On the one hand, there seems to be plenty 
of room for hope with regards to international cooperation within the Arctic realm as scientific 
research efforts spanning several international boundaries continue to flourish (Borgerson, 2013; 
Anon, 2018b). Other predictions posit an altogether different picture. According to the US 
Department of Defense’s 2019 Arctic Strategy, “the Arctic is a potential avenue for expanded great 
power competition and aggression spanning between two key regions of ongoing competition 
identified in the [National Defense Strategy]” (US DoD, 2019). During the Arctic Council’s 
Ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland in 2019, current US Secretary of State, Michael 
Pompeo, made mention of Russian militarization and aggression along their northern coastline 
(Pompeo, 2019). He also tied the current hard-power buildup in the Arctic directly to the inability 
to trust Russia’s intentions given its historic violent tendencies with regards to territories of 
interest, a clear reference to recent violations of sovereignty in Ukraine (Pompeo, 2019).  
 The third option appears to be what is actually developing currently in the Arctic. This 
course of action consists of a blended approach of the first two possible realities. This means that 
while the Kremlin clearly desires to make its military might known in the Arctic arena, the 
Federation has also demonstrated a genuine desire to cooperate along several soft-power related 
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vectors. Military buildup is often very obvious and tends to be ‘news worthy’ as the sensational 
appeal of inherent danger often associated with military-oriented topics grabs the attention of the 
public more readily; therefore, this aspect of Russian Arctic policy will receive attention first.  
Pavel Baev, of the Oslo Peace Research Institute, points out that the Russian security 
narrative stems from an exaggerated perception of US aggression and presence in the ever more 
accessible Arctic Ocean (2019). This has provoked a sizeable buildup along the northern 
Federation coastline. Certainly, the need to protect their sizeable nuclear arms presence in the Kola 
Peninsula indeed requires some form of physical security establishment (Baev, 2019). The position 
of the Kola Peninsula presents a series of issues for relations among the northern nations. If one 
consults the geographic position of this land feature, it becomes clear that such a massive flexing 
of hard power capabilities in this vicinity might very well affect the security perception of the 
Nordic states. One of these states, Norway, belongs to NATO and two, Sweden and Finland, are 
members of the EU. This ties NATO and EU interests to an area closely associated with a perceived 
threat increase.   
Russia has made substantial additions to its defense-in-depth security concept. With a 
robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) system comprised of submarines and surface vessels, 
ballistic missiles, and a bevy of S-400 Triumph surface-to-air missiles, there seems to be little 
reason to continue establishing a veritable ‘fortress of the north’ encompassing much of the 
Russian oceanic shoreline (Staalesen, 2017; Baev, 2019). And yet, according to the US Secretary 
of State, the Russian government has been working to create just that reality (Pompeo, 2019). 
Recently, a new Arctic command has been stood up by Moscow, signaling a serious shift in focus, 
alongside the establishment of four new Arctic brigade combat teams, fourteen airfields, sixteen 
deep-water ports and the continued maintenance of a fleet comprised of forty ice breakers with 
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more in development (Gramer, 2017). By comparison, the United States, with its sizeable stake in 
the Arctic region and gargantuan defense budget and economy when compared to the Russian 
Federation, possesses a mere two ice breakers (Gramer, 2017).  
If this was not enough to cause concern, the Russians have taken an aggressive stance with 
regards to their military exercises of late. The world worried at the beginning of the 2017 Zapad 
exercise as to the true intentions behind such a large set of maneuvers (Reid, 2017). During this 
September event, the Russian military executed battle drills at the strategic level to counter a 
simulated invasion by NATO-member countries (Reid, 2017). Though this in itself was nothing 
new, the recent annexation of Crimea and unrest of eastern Ukraine only added to regional tensions 
as many nations considered the worst-case scenario. It is recognized that military exercises are 
held by major powers in order to accommodate several interests. Most obviously, the rehearsal of 
strategic operational plans ranks high on the priority list of security-related issues during times of 
peace, but the benefits don’t stop there. Displaying strength to intimidate adversaries and reassure 
allies while simultaneously providing a means of illustrating regional influence by showcasing 
other armed forces who choose to join in such the multi-national efforts plays a large part in 
establishing a hierarchy of hard power capability.  
The most recent of these Russian exercises, Tsentre, took place in September 2019. 
According to Russian news sources, maneuvers and rehearsals included 128,000 military 
personnel, 20,000 pieces of special military equipment (such as artillery and air defense systems), 
600 aircraft and a sizeable naval force (Sukhankin, 2019). Of perhaps even greater significance 
was the cooperation of several nations, including China, India and most of the central-Asian 
nations collectively acting in concert within a multi-national joint task force (Sukhankin, 2019). 
Such demonstrations of military might appear to be increasing in size, complexity and 
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inclusiveness in a manner that seems specifically designed to counter potential NATO efforts. At 




Adding teeth to the US Secretary of State’s comments at the 2019 Arctic Council 
conference, the Russian government has made several demands with regards to the rights of those 
seeking transit along the Northern Sea Route (see Figure 1). Currently, warships of foreign entities 
are allowed passage along this route that skirts along the northern coast of Russia, but only with 
prior authorization and approval from Russia (Aliyev, 2019). Shipping laden with hydrocarbons 
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could face even further restrictions if they are not of Russian origin (Aliyev, 2019). To add to the 
resistance that the West, and specifically the US, has towards these state-based limitations, the 
Russian government has stipulated that even sovereign warships, generally free of such security 
measures, must be willing to have Russian pilots board for inspections (Kozachenko et al., 2019). 
To refuse such actions could result in Russian security forces applying ‘emergency measures up 
to the arrest or destruction of the vessel’ (Kozachenko et al., 2019). This act of managing both 
commerce and military ship movement through these Arctic waters is a clear violation of freedom 
of navigation as the US sees it under its national policy of freedom within ‘the commons’ (Fahey, 
2018).  
While these actions illustrate Russia’s decidedly bellicose stance toward Arctic 
development and control of access to portions of associated waterways, this narrative constitutes 
only part of the story of Russian involvement within the confines of the Far North. One year after 
planting its national flag beneath the sea ice, Russia undertook a series of steps to integrate itself 
into a cooperative effort with other northern nations. In 2008, the Federation joined the other Arctic 
states within the Ilulissat Declaration, aiding significantly in establishing boundaries of access and 
control, reasserted the agreed upon UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) and 
demonstrated a willingness to be a working member of the Arctic Council (Borgerson, 2013).  
Shortly thereafter, Norway and Russia settled a dispute concerning boundaries associated with the 
Svalbard Islands (Borgerson, 2013).  
Another key manifestation of cooperative efforts stems from the harsh realities of the 
landscape north of the Arctic Circle itself. Due to the dangerous nature of the environment, ships, 
aircraft, and people who become stranded, lost, or suffer mechanical malfunction may quickly find 
themselves in a catastrophic situation. The preservation of citizenry and equipment from loss is a 
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desirable conclusion to such scenarios. However, the great distances and extremely austere 
considerations often render such efforts at recovery a task of great difficulty. Therefore, the Arctic 
nations have entered into several binding agreements wherein they will respond as necessary and 
in the most expeditious manner to distress calls under the auspices of search and rescue efforts 
regardless of nationalities involved (Stephenson, 2012). These arrangements create a dissonance 
when compared to the aggressive Russian posture often referred to by heads of state.  
Indeed, Russia seems to be playing well with others if one observes these notable examples 
of cooperation. However, the military buildup and belligerent posturing associated with access 
control, nested with the ongoing desire for Russia to continue diversifying its economic portfolio, 
cannot be disregarded. It appears that Moscow would like to keep its options open, protect its 
northernmost border, and maintain its position as a regional-to-global level influence. 
Simultaneously, the Kremlin seeks to continue its role as a ‘team player’ within the Arctic Council 
and as an expert at Arctic maritime operations, to include being an integral member of such 
humanitarian-based efforts as search and rescue in notoriously harsh environments. This balance 
between realist tendencies and power-sharing influences presents a potential opportunity. The rest 
of this thesis consists of determining potential methods by which the West can ensure that the latter 
motivation becomes dominant in the eyes of Putin and his eventual successors rather than the 









CHAPTER 4: RE-ASSESSING NATO 
 Much has been written about the security posture of Russia over the years. A significant 
portion of this accumulated knowledge is anchored in modern international relations, but it is 
important to understand the role that identity plays in its myriad forms. To do this, the scope must 
expand somewhat. In the interest of time, this paper will barely begin to address the litany of works 
corresponding with this particular topic of ontological security studies. However, the idea of border 
integrity and expansion of territory in order to maintain a securitized populace as well as political 
stability is well maintained. For the past 500 years, Russia experienced invasive conquests and 
limited incursions from outside powers from the European west and from the steppe regions to the 
east and south. It was, in fact, the push to anchor the overly accessible Russian borders with 
defensible geographic features, which would block, re-route, or funnel potential attackers, that led 
to Ivan IV’s expansion to the Ural Mountains, Caucasus Mountains, and the Caspian Sea (Ross, 
2013).  
A history significantly impacted by outside threats posing existential challenges to the state 
gained further reinforcement in the 1940s with the invasion by Germany and by France in the 
century prior. Undeniably, the distrust based on broken alliances and invasion by allies and 
modern, enlightened nations plays a role in modern Russian outlook. The Cold War, steeped in 
ideological differences and defined by the establishment of the NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff, 
certainly did not assist in thawing relations or changing this perception. Once the threat of Soviet 
domination in Central Asia and Eastern Europe dissipated in the early 1990s, the menace posed by 
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NATO not only persisted, but expanded ever eastward, consuming once-Soviet territories until it 
bordered the Federation itself.  
This long-established dynamic of distrust only deepened after the Bush Sr. administration 
made assurances that NATO would cease further expansion efforts, assurances soon broken 
(Breslauer, 2013). Russia’s leaders would not forget this betrayal and the proximity of the Western 
alliance became even more onerous for the Federation to bear. It is important to note that the 
influence of insecurity based solely on borders and land acquisition has waned over time. From 
Russia’s standpoint, this holds especially true as it poses ones of the few examples of sovereignty 
violation in recent decades. However, the uncertainty posed by NATO support to nations 
surrounding the Russian homeland, Western military exercises that grow in size and increasing in 
proximity to Russia itself, and an increasingly austere economic landscape due to the sanctions 
regime discussed earlier all converge to create a perilous scenario (Anon, 2018a). A narrative 
quickly emerges of a once proud and influential nation now under siege on many fronts by 
untrustworthy adversaries, eager to seize upon any opportunity detrimental to the motherland 
(Anon, 2018a). From a Western perspective, a continued push eastward with the most successful 
military alliance in history may seem a powerful coercive force to achieve desired objectives, but 
it may have had the reverse effect. 
The continued push for NATO expansion, both in membership and in roles and 
responsibilities, by the West has not led to the peaceful outcomes associated with the 
organization’s stated purpose (Zimmerman, 2001). Though there may have been a moment in 
time where the Federation considered the idea of joining the NATO alliance, that time has 
passed. By 1999, two-thirds of the Russian population considered the continued expansion 
unfavorably or very unfavorably (Anon, 2017a; Zimmerman, 2001). As a result of continued 
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NATO expansion, the Russian Military Doctrine of 2014 lists the buildup of NATO capabilities 
as the number one ‘external danger’ to the Federation (Baev, 2019).  
George Kennan, a respected expert on Russian-American relations during the Cold War 
and post-Cold War period, stated with dismay that an expansion of the US-led NATO alliance 
would have detrimental consequences across the board (1997). He particularly emphasized that 
both the security and the ‘prestige’ of Russia would be under assault in the eyes of Russian 
citizens (1997). Kennan also posited that such a perceived threat would only lead to a militarized 
response and a turn away from the West in order to attain a desired end state (1997). 
Additionally, the ‘nation under siege’ narrative has most likely played quite a large role in 
enabling Putin in his quest for greater power as the executive. A proverbial wolf outside the door 
would fuel the popular belief that a strong leader is required to maintain security against a 
looming threat. Ironically, the democracy defending alliance may in fact be undermining 
democratization efforts underway in the Federation since the fall of communism. It would seem 
that the continued push for NATO membership and projection of its presence in a manner 
threatening to the Russian sense of security ultimately results in the realization of fewer desired 
outcomes. Rather, a series of undesirable symptoms emerge in a pattern disturbing to the 
Western observer.  
Many still believe that NATO represents an essential requirement when dealing with the 
Federation, especially in areas of potential territorial dispute. This may be a mistaken 
assumption, however. First, recall that Putin openly bemoans the loss of the Soviet Union. There 
are many reasons for this, but not least of them is the loss of prestige, influence and safety 
enjoyed by the Soviet state during its heyday of nuclear standoff with the US. Many influences 
transpired to bring about the eventual downfall of the Soviet state, but undoubtedly one of the 
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most powerful and ever-present influences was NATO. This is not forgotten by much of the 
Russian populace. Second, the very purpose of NATO from the start was two-fold: to contain 
and resist communist expansion in Europe and to secure Europe for cooperation and prosperity, 
reinforced by the ideals of democracy and free market economics (SIS Faculty, 2018). This was 
an organization meant to undermine Soviet power expansion, and to defeat it by hard power 
means if necessary. Following the fall of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact crumbled and NATO 
began to gobble up ex-Soviet states to aid in their transition to democracy. While the notion of a 
military-based alliance system endures in Europe to promote cooperation, the main reason it does 
so is precisely due to a resurgent Russian threat (SIS, Faculty, 2018). There is no room for 
partnership with a perceived foe. NATO’s automatic involvement in a delicate situation, such as 
Arctic development, would provide fuel to the proverbial fire rather than a soothing balm.  
Despite this deep-seated enmity, cooperation has been attempted before. In 1997 the 
“Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian 
Federation” was signed, promising a new age of partnership between the historic adversaries. 
This hope proved ephemeral as the 1999 NATO-led bombing campaign in Yugoslavia dashed 
the fledgling cooperative spirit (Gorskii, 2001). Unfortunately, there currently exist too many 
conflicting interests and too entrenched a history of animosity between the Federation and 
NATO to ensure cooperative efforts above the Arctic Circle at this moment in time.  It is hard to 
see how the Russian state would ever gladly cooperate with NATO efforts at present. Especially 
as it remains an organization whose main purpose is as a counterbalance to Russian power in the 
European theater.  
When one empathizes with Russia’s strategic position, the trend towards isolation and 
perception of pressures closing in on all fronts crystalizes further. All other nations with the 
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Arctic Ocean as a boundary are part of NATO; furthermore, they constitute active members in 
the Western-led sanctions regime against Russia. The significance of these states unified in 
punitive action should not be lost on the observer, especially when considering Russian 
militarization within the Far North. An examination of a map of the Arctic reveals that the 
Russian state appears more isolated and surrounded than ever on an increasingly vulnerable 
border as sea access becomes the new normal. Remember that part of the ontological ‘suite’ of 
belief touchstones is that even dangerous or hostile realities that fit within a familiar narrative are 
embraced if they maintain a comfortable status quo between oneself and the Other (Chernobrov, 
2016). Therefore, it is logical to assume that unless the cycle resulting in continued distrust and 
stalemate is broken by one or both sides that this dynamic will continue within the Arctic Circle 
despite early indicators of cooperation (Chernobrov, 2016). For the Federation, these influences 
reinforce the narrative of the necessity of a defensive posture. The balance of power is to be 
maintained in an anarchic world comprised of opportunities to be seized and threats to be 
countered, a realist view of international relations made manifest.   
So, what is to be done regarding NATO? There appears to be enough evidence to suggest 
that the ever-expanding alliance, though quite successful in many ways, has triggered the 
Russian populace and government into seeing a veritable boogeyman encroaching on their 
doorstep. Espen Barth Eide, Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in a 2013 interview 
that NATO should be involved in the Far North because of the opportunities for cooperation to 
solve common issues that require complex solutions and due to the interest being taken by far 
flung communities well outside the NATO purview, such as China. He also argued that the 
emphasis should not be a military one but because there are interests of growing importance to 
the Arctic nations that cannot be ignored, the Far North should remain on NATO’s ‘watch list’ 
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(Eide, 2013). Anna Wieslander, secretary general of the Swedish Defense Association, believes 
firmly that NATO must become more involved because no other institution deals with hard 
power security issues in that region (2019). She continues to support her stance by pointing to 
spillover effects of conflicts elsewhere influencing this new Arctic arena and by recognizing the 
possibility of a burgeoning great power race (Wieslander, 2019).  
But why should this be? Primarily, the security concerns among the nations of the Arctic 
region have been economic or environmental related, not military. The recently released 
‘Canadian Arctic and Northern Policy’ addresses eight key topics for consideration by the 
government, with only one of them relating to defense and security (2019). Canada has the 
second largest coastline shared by the Arctic Ocean. Yet even the defense and security portion of 
its Arctic Policy is dedicated largely to mitigation of environmental impacts associated with 
climate change, economic development as it pertains to improving the quality of life of Northern 
populations, and emergency management (2019). Undeniably, the growing importance of the 
Arctic becoming accessible would be a concern for those nations occupied with the development 
of resources and economic advantages associated with its rightful claims. However, the typical 
jockeying for position as the major power in the region rings hollow and may even be 
unnecessary in this case.  
  As stated previously, the Arctic provides far more opportunities for coming together 
than for establishing another realm of great power conflict. This is what the international 
community needs to seize upon. The nations of the Far North share many of the same values and 
the only outlier is Russia, this puts the neoliberal framework to the test as Russia demonstrates a 
willingness to cooperate within agreement frameworks and participates in international 
organizations. Already, the US and Russia have begun cooperating with regards to ship-routing 
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operations in the Bering Strait that divides the two powers (Sfraga and Brigham, 2018). Norway 
and Russian tensions regarding the Svalbard Archipelago have been intermittent the last decade 
or so, but there appears to be a willingness to negotiate and come to an agreement satisfactory to 
both parties (Closson, 2018). Though there remains a question over where control over this land 
mass begins and ends for Norway and Russia, who has some historic ties to this strategic 
location, this seems to be more centered around the NATO threat posed to its security rather than 
any serious desire to contest the ownership of the islands (Closson, 2018). One of the recent 
incidents that received the most coverage was the Russian Elektron fishing vessel that the 
Norwegian coast guard chased off and represents a policing effort over fishing rights rather than 
a military issue (Closson, 2018). This is hardly the manifestation of the hawks’ belief that Russia 
will lay claim to vast swaths of Arctic land and seascape at the point of a gun if given the 
opportunity.  
As for the conventional arms buildup, there are cracks appearing in the fearsome Russian 
visage. First, the Syrian conflict has not been a completely positive situation for Moscow. Putin’s 
ally, Bashar al-Assad, has put Russia on the opposing side of a conflict with its ally, Turkey 
(Tharoor, 2020). The financial cost, loss of equipment, and requirement for maintenance and 
upkeep have been immense. Furthermore, a World Bank estimate in 2018 of energy amounting 
to 65% of total Russian exports, vulnerability to price fluctuation and its attendant financial 
crisis, persists despite efforts towards diversification (Ellyat, 2015; Anon, 2019a). This ties into 
the second crack in the narrative that Russia will only continue its aggressive militaristic 
expansion unchecked for the foreseeable future. The canary in the coal mine in this gloomy 
economic picture is the recent move by Moscow to detract from the Russian pension program by 
increasing the age of retirement (Bennetts, 2018). This led to a massive slide in Putin’s approval 
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rating and a rare concession from the authoritarian leader regarding the retirement age for 
women as he attempts to shore up support while still promoting the message that austere 
economic measures must be taken to avoid a financial disaster (Bennetts, 2018). The 
contributing demographic forecast of an impending crisis as the population continues to decrease 
for various health reasons points towards a regional power with global ambitions, but in 
possession of clay feet (Haass, 2017; Bennetts, 2018).  
The onset of the current coronavirus event sweeping through China, parts of Europe, 
Southeast Asia, Iran and the United States has taken a further toll. Oil prices have dropped 
substantially, Nissan has announced that it will suspend vehicle production in Russia if the 
developing situation becomes a pandemic, and Chinese tourism to the Federation has been put on 
hold until the situation changes (Sinelschikova, 2020; Standish and Johnson, 2020). The 
disruption of business with China threatens to undo $110 billion in trade conducted in 2019 as 
Russian exports to China dropped by a third so far in 2020 and skyrocketing prices in foodstuffs, 
often imported from China, affects Russia’s more vulnerable populations in the Far East (Simes, 
2020). Alexey Belogoryev, deputy director of the energy studies at the Moscow Institute for 
Energy and Finance, claims that if the epidemic continues into June, ‘then the price of oil will 
definitely fall below $50 per barrel’ (Simes, 2020). This has already occurred and oil traded at 
$33 per barrel as of March, mostly due to an ill-advised oil standoff with Saudi Arabia (Standish 
and Johnson, 2020). While the full impact of this current outbreak remains unclear, the 
heightened vulnerability of the Russian economy to factors outside its control poses current and 
future uncertainty that must be taken into account. Furthermore, if the coronavirus has an impact 
relative to that which Italy, Spain, and the United States is currently experiencing, then the Putin 
administration may face its most serious challenge yet (Standish, 2020). These factors hardly 
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depict a rising world power ready to stake ambitious designs against a unified military and 
economic alliance.  
Instead, these factors should illuminate a path forward towards cooperative efforts along 
several fronts within the Arctic realm. However, much of this hinges upon whether or not the 
West can coax Russia into making a choice that aligns with cooperation and not competition. It 
is impossible to know with complete certainty what the single, most important factor is involved 
in the calculus that must occur within the halls of the Kremlin to ensure this outcome. What is 
plain, however, is that the presence of its self-professed greatest security threat, NATO, will 
certainly be a part of these deliberations. Russia shows time and time again that in the face of a 
perceived threat it will prefer a show of strength rather than weakness. The reason for this 
consists of myriad motivations, but they each undoubtedly tie to its identity of self as well as to 
its ambitions. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the onus rests upon the West to determine the 
future of the operating environment in this scenario.  
Given the defensive mindset of the Russian Federation, it seems unlikely that the 
expenditure in manpower, finance, and materiel towards the militarization of its north coast will 
be reversed and, in fact, there are no grounds to even expect such a move. Buildup does not 
necessarily mean intent for offensive or overtly aggressive action as seen in NATO exercises 
such as Trident Juncture or Russia’s Zapad maneuvers. Furthermore, given the strains to the 
Federation’s budget by overseas adventurism, economic trends, and demographic horizons 
already mentioned, the Russians are keenly aware of the fragility of their position. Therefore, it 
seems highly likely that cooperation will become much more palatable to the Kremlin, but it is 
essential that the West does not overplay its hand from its position of strength.  
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Along with the growing pains associated with the prospect of facilitating troubled nations 
into the NATO alliance, there must be a serious recalibration of what problematic areas should 
include the vaunted Article 5 protections afforded by membership (O’Hanlon, 2017). By 
overstretching the coverage of mutual assistance, there exists the possibility of a waning interest 
in the membership states’ respective populations in supporting military responses in distant parts 
of the world where national interest remains unclear (O’Hanlon, 2017). In an effort to maintain 
credibility and viability, the NATO team should carefully reconsider expanding operations 
within the Artic in a hasty manner without obvious need. 
With this in mind, the Arctic nations should consider the following:  
First, Russia and her people perceive the threat of NATO, to be a real and present danger 
to the Federation and a constant reminder of how Russia is separate from the West, something 
that NATO expansion has done little to allay (Galliher, 2019). The potential for further 
expansion along Russia’s southern flank only exacerbates such concerns (Galliher, 2019). 
Whether or not these fears of NATO as an existential threat are at all founded in reality is beside 
the point. From the Russian perspective, it may seem as though the West wishes to force 
compliance to normative values, an end state which is probably more achievable by means other 
than coercion. To include the military alliance in operations north of the Arctic Circle could 
expand this threat along Russia’s northern boundary and needlessly aggravate the situation. 
Therefore, NATO should be the last tool utilized in an effort to stabilize relationships while 
simultaneously promoting an influential ‘spillover’ effect of norms and values associated with 
Western ideals.  
Second, the Arctic nations should consider the Arctic Ocean a largely non-NATO zone. 
This does not imply NATO presence is absent as any non-Russian military element from an 
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Arctic state would be, by definition, part of the NATO alliance. Instead, military exercises and 
NATO-specific maneuvers should be kept below the Arctic Circle if possible. Does this require a 
power vacuum in the northerly reaches? Absolutely not. As Russia adopts pre-emptive measures 
along its more accessible northern coast, it should be expected that other nations will follow suit 
to varying degrees according to perceived need. This remains a sovereign right and should not be 
discouraged. Finally, this tactical withdrawal of alliance activity has long term strategic 
objectives and does not render the Arctic reaches defenseless against the potential machinations 
of Russia or other encroaching powers. As it turns out, significant deterrence capability remains 
close at hand. The US recently reinstated its airbase in Keflavik, Iceland, and continues to 
maintain its power projection platform in Thule, Greenland as well as bases in the UK and an 
Arctic training base in northern Norway (Bauke, 2018; Husseini, 2019). Halfway around the 
globe, Alaska presents a formidable platform for military projection as elements stationed there 
continually support allies and maintain airspace and maritime sovereignty. Military-based 
security in support of Western values and norms already exists, but it does not necessarily 
require the NATO ‘brand’, much less the furtherance of NATO-led exercises or presence which 
may unnecessarily fan the flames of discord.  
Furthermore, none of this would necessitate a pullback from the normal duties of NATO 
as they currently stand. The continued threat posed by Russia is a reality that cannot be safely 
ignored. The Federation has demonstrated its desire to push the envelope as mentioned earlier in 
this thesis. There is no reason to suspect that an area of cooperation opening in one global arena 
would mean the shuttering of an area of potential conflict in another, at least not immediately or 
automatically. Such concerns should be met by the normal range of responses carried out by the 
NATO alliance. Areas such as the Baltics and Poland should continue to consider themselves 
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under the aegis of protection provided by Article 5. However, not every security situation 
requires warships and jet aircraft sorties to deliver a solution, which brings us to the final 
suggestion.  
An essential part to fostering working relations should entail embracing the establishment 
of an Arctic policing force. It appears at this juncture that physical tensions within this 
geographic space are limited to issues best left to the relevant coast guards of the offended 
parties. As the Far North opens further to outside maritime presence, the need to maintain an 
effective status quo and procedures for safe passage and law-abiding economic activity will be 
paramount. By creating a law enforcement team comprised of all nations sharing portions of this 
global area, it would create a sense of common purpose, work towards relieving security-based 
tensions rooted in distrust, and maximize coverage within this difficult operating environment 
while encouraging an honest broker mentality by all partners.  
Who should ensure that such a policing effort is coordinated and utilized appropriately? 
Fortunately, an organization already exists comprised of all the Arctic states. Through this 
internationally recognized organization, a host of issues would receive specifically tailored 
attention and solutions in an inclusive environment for all interested parties. The organization in 
question is, of course, the Arctic Council. The next section of this thesis briefly covers some of 
the issues that could be addressed by this supranational entity and how it is most suitably placed 








CHAPTER 5: THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
 The information referenced here regarding the Arctic Council’s organization and 
limitations comes directly from their website and is easily accessed at https://arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us. Currently, this deliberative body represents an 
intergovernmental forum facilitating cooperation, coordination, and interaction among its 
members. The nation-state members include: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the US. Chairmanship works on a rotational basis and lasts two years. 
Iceland holds the position at this time. Membership also includes six Permanent Participants 
representing indigenous peoples residing within the Arctic Circle, as well. These organizations 
actively give voice to nations within the borders of Scandinavia, Canada, the US, and Russia. 
The Council is comprised of six working groups primarily focused on the efforts targeting 
sustainable development of infrastructure, environmental preservation, and conservation of 
wildlife and habitat; however, there exists the possibility of establishing specific task forces as 
required.  
 For the purposes alluded to in the previous section, limitations exist on the operating 
boundaries placed upon this organization and they must be addressed if any serious consideration 
is to be contemplated. First, and most obviously, the Arctic Council’s mandate explicitly 
precludes involvement in military security issues. This should not change. As the efforts 
mentioned above include operations of a policing nature generally addressed by the various 
nations’ coast guard capabilities, the absence of military response makes no difference to the 
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recommended approach. Second, no mechanisms currently exist by which this organization 
implements or enforces its guidelines. However, this does not necessarily degrade the 
effectiveness of the Council either as this is already a voluntary organization into which all 
Arctic states claim membership and should remain without the possibility of ‘taking sides’ in an 
effort to remain objective. Finally, the reality of the Arctic Council is that it is simply a forum at 
this point and, therefore, has no allocated budget with all programs receiving funding from the 
states that choose to sponsor programs of interest. This, of perhaps all the limitations, comprises 
the biggest hurdle as there would be a requirement for consistent staffing, positions of 
adjudication, and professionals on hand to coordinate, advise, and communicate efforts from this 
leadership hub.  
 The Arctic Council has already enjoyed significant success. It has enabled the forging of 
agreements and made inroads with international problem sets in the past and is currently re-
assessing its future role in the ever-changing environment it has catered to since the mid-1990s 
(Exner-Pirot et al., 2019). Furthermore, it is ideally situated for adjudicating and facilitating 
discussion between involved parties without being tied to national loyalties and hard power 
politics. This has enabled its resiliency over the years and facilitated the respect it receives from 
members states and observers (Exner-Pirot et al., 2019). This created a separation from the 
geopolitical woes plaguing much of the world involving Russia and the West. This aspect of the 
organization should be preserved if at all possible. Despite the standoff between these two 
entities in so many areas, great strides have been accomplished in the areas of search and rescue 
(SAR), oil pollution preparedness and response, and scientific cooperation due to the utilization 
of the Arctic Council’s unique capabilities (Exner-Pirot et al., 2019).  
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 Arctic SAR, environmental change, oil and transit pollution response, and fishing rights 
comprise several of the topics of negotiation which the Council has enabled and within which its 
members have found common ground within a relatively apolitical working environment. Even 
Vladimir Putin, who is sometimes known to react less enthusiastically to the admonitions of 
climate change advocates, has seemingly begun to take heed of these predictions as he agreed to 
participate in the Paris Climate Accords (Bershidsky, 2019; Putin, 2019). This and some of the 
Arctic-specific agreements already mentioned, may well be part of a realist approach by Putin in 
order to establish Russia as a respectable neighbor and steward of nature while the topic makes 
front headlines in the West (Ananyeva, 2019). Certainly, the desire to join an organization in 
which Russia’s voice receives weight and attention, especially as a cooperative member, 
provides a potential avenue for illustrating Russia’s willingness to be an honest broker as well as 
a fundamental lead in issues of global consequence. Regardless of the true intentions behind 
Moscow’s actions in agreeing to these limiting acts of legislation, it isn’t the motivation that 
matters as much as the interaction and the establishment of agreed upon norms and values that 
become habitual over time. These, in turn, create avenues for potential change in other areas 
which the liberal ideology would uphold. The repeated act of gaining a cooperative partner in 
Russia along lines of international concern is a step in the right direction.  
However, if these steps are to continue with meaningful effectiveness, the Arctic Council 
must reconsider its future role in substantial ways. At the moment, it acts as a pseudo nonprofit 
organization enabling discussion as a ‘decision-shaper’ rather than a ‘decision-maker’ (Wilson, 
2016). But this won’t be enough with the future landscape drawing closer. Though respected as a 
forum for Arctic affairs, it needs to recalibrate in certain areas if it is to maintain its effectiveness 
and steer the direction of development and interface between nations’ interests and vulnerable 
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territories. Such measures must be taken if it is to make a difference in redirecting the path of 
future affairs in such a way that maximizes peaceful coexistence and minimizes detrimental 
impact to the environment. At present, the Council is largely what the individual states wish it to 
be as that is a direct reflection of how they interact and compromise. The continued participation 
in agreements facilitated by the Council is due to the members of the Council themselves, not the 
Council as an entity. This represents a crucial change requirement moving forward.   
The Council must firmly align its ways and means with its strategic ends in order to 
establish concrete goals and objectives. Without this, efforts towards change will be harder to 
attain and may lead to an overall aimlessness. In 2017 it was reported that there were 100 
projects being undertaken, ranging from a migratory bird initiative, separate from the seabird 
program, to education in the northern latitudes (Balton and Ulmer, 2019). While this reflects the 
noble intentions of the Council, this also illustrates the overwhelming breadth of concerns 
addressed as well as the lack of clarity and inability to close out these myriad initiatives. To 
counter this, an expansion in facilities and personnel, comprised of participants of all Arctic 
states, will be necessary. Further funding will also be required by member states in capacities 
they agree upon, GDP may be a good starting reference point.   
As for security, some of this has been addressed already. The use of coast guard elements 
for enforcement of laws and international sovereignty rights should remain firmly in place, but 
the methods should shift from purely national to international, cooperative efforts. Another 
option could be the establishment of an Arctic-specific law enforcement agency, potentially 
modelled off INTERPOL. Given the unique operating environment and associated challenges, 
requiring specialized equipment and procedures, such a decision would be justified. Regardless, 
there are several solutions to meet the need. For now, this decision should be left up to the 
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Council and member states to determine whether the Arctic Council will receive reinforcement 
and expand its roles and responsibilities. This would strengthen and deepen ties among nations 
taking part and would also work towards keeping security efforts squarely within the non-
military realm of operations. Some claim that military assets are necessary to meet the 
requirements posed by the harsh environment of the Arctic and this may prove true at times. 
However, these should be exceptions and should be utilized as clear interpretations of 
enforcement, rescue, or recovery within agreed upon measures associated with recognized 
legislation, such as within standing Arctic SAR agreements (Wilson, 2016). As the Arctic 
continues to open, more resources are expected to be redirected to these northerly regions. 
Already, the US is well underway in adding to its meager fleet of ice breakers which will fall 
under the aegis of its national coast guard.  
 This will obviously require a change in how the Council goes about establishing legal 
constraints on its power. The Council’s inception occurred during a period of calm, where 
disputes were settled with relative ease. Any past legal constraints could be sidestepped by 
utilizing the UNCLOS, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), or in 
agreements brokered via the Council forum (Wilson, 2016). There is reason to believe that the 
growing complexity of an unfrozen ocean expanse would undermine such certainties quickly, 
with under-powered and under-resourced institutions playing catch-up after tensions flare. By 
taking proactive steps now, such an outcome can be avoided. Heather Conley notes that incidents 
such as the Shell North Sea oil spill and the recovery of a Boeing 737 by Canadian SAR teams, 
both occurring in 2011, provide examples wherein the current framework simply does not meet 
the need established by the emerging situation (2012). The proposed use of NATO by many, due 
43 
 
largely to assets available and territory controlled by NATO members, as the means to meet 
these growing needs should be resisted if at all possible (O’Rourke, 2013). 
 Coordination and agreement of efforts in responses to threats to the environment, 
humanity, commerce and sovereignty is a necessity. While maintaining individual states’ 
freedoms within this region of the world must be enticing, the benefits of hammering out a 
conclusive treaty-based organization wherein rules and laws can be enacted effectively will 
surely see greater results in the long run. States desire to be part of programs and institutions 
wherein their voices can be heard and needs addressed, even if they must be compromised upon. 
If such an organization could be created out of the respected foundations and relationships forged 
already by the Arctic Council, those involved already would very well continue to utilize it as a 
method to create that shared understanding and focused mindset the Arctic demands.  
At this juncture, it may seem desirous that the US utilize its international influence to 
leverage against this difficulty. However, it must be kept in mind that the US does not make a 
habit of ratifying treaties due to self-imposed limitations. Some observers conclude that this 
stems from simple hubris or from a desire to maintain operational ‘wiggle room’ to ensure that 
any agreements aligned with its desired worldview. The truth is a bit more complicated as any 
treaty would, according to the US Constitution, require approval of the President and two-thirds 
of the Senate to be accepted. Though this is certainly an institutional obstacle, it is hardly 
impossible to clear. Of more significance to the US, any treaty so ratified would be considered as 
binding as the Constitution itself. This would mean that the US could be held accountable far 
more effectively than other nations who have been historically eager to align themselves with 
such processes without significant consequence attached should they fail to meet goals or 
agreed-upon metrics (e.g. Paris Climate Accords, Kyoto Protocol, UNCLOS, etc.) (Murray, 
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2017). Therefore, it would be best to socialize that support via ratification of a proposed treaty 
would be an impractical expectation from the US standpoint. That being said, such agreements 
should influence a significant part of the US’ Arctic Strategy as it recalculates the importance of 
the Far North, the Arctic Council, and the end state which could be achieved by utilizing more 



















CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
The drastic reduction in the thickness and extent of ice in the Arctic Ocean presents the 
world with opportunities for both conflict and cooperation. The Arctic states find themselves 
ideally poised to deal with such eventual collisions or merging of interests. However, this will 
only prove the case if they act swiftly and in unison. The question of how best to deal with this 
emergent situation will remain for some time within both academia and in the halls of 
governments.  
This paper examined the contentious relationship between Russia and the Western 
sanctions regime. By utilizing this specific example, the current parameters within which both 
parties have operated for the past five years is established. The fact that this reality also extends 
throughout the coming Arctic expansion is why this case study provides such a unique example 
of how to overcome this gridlock. Realism and liberalism play out against each other in various 
ways south of the Arctic Circle, but, within this northern field of potential, the desire to 
cooperate and gain via consensus seems more attainable than ever.  
There may be several ways to come about such a desirable conclusion, but this paper 
examines two paths specifically: the reassessment of NATO and a significant reconsideration of 
the Arctic Council. These two solution-based approaches should be considered with the long-
term benefits in mind. Furthermore, the author considers it best if they can be applied 
simultaneously and not out of synch. By resisting the urge to recklessly plunge into the Arctic 
with NATO at the helm, the states arrayed at the northern-most points of the globe may be able 
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to achieve what decades of stand-off and posturing have not. Likewise, by re-evaluating the 
purpose and design of the Arctic Council an organization with organic buy-in and experience in 
this particular arena may emerge as the new norm-establishing entity, accomplishing real change 
and enforcing agreed upon rules as an impartial adjudicator. True progress in a geospatial area 
vulnerable to many global problem sets would surely have cascading effects beneficial to far 
more than the primary Council member states. 
By taking real steps to dismantle the cycle of established actor roles for other states, we 
can make serious inroads into disrupting the back and forth of standoff and reflexive posturing 
for position on the international stage. NATO is perceived as the enemy of Russia and it has been 
utilized as a major tool of the West to reduce the influence and relative power of the Federation. 
If the roles were reversed, how willing would the West be to make conciliatory gestures and 
invest trust in an organization seemingly set on the reduction of national prestige with armored 
brigades, nuclear-laden missiles, and menacing aircraft? Strength is respected, there is no doubt. 
But much of the perceived need for such displays of hard power stems directly from the self-
serving cycle that these weapons were created to deter. If the Arctic is eventually to become 
another geospatial side show of business as usual between the two adversaries, then so be it. But 
there is no reason to force this outcome without giving alternative possibilities a fighting chance.  
When one considers the Cold War and the brushes with existential disaster faced by the 
world, one must also consider what brought us back from the brink of mutual annihilation. Many 
today claim that Mutually Assured Destruction would keep the specter of nuclear holocaust at 
bay. However, when the world came closest to releasing these horrific weapons upon one 
another, during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Operation Able Archer, it was the human element 
that averted the worst of outcomes from transpiring. Diplomacy and individual actors turned the 
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tide and avoided the collision that seemed all but inevitable in both scenarios. As Alexander 
Wendt put it, “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Collins, 2014). Though anarchy and its 
attendant uncertainty may be unavoidable, it can be transcended through interaction, 
understanding, and developing new certainties (Collins, 2014). Ultimately, it was not the 
weapons designed for destruction, but rather the people willing to break the wheel of distrust and 
incomplete understanding that pulled the world back from the brink of nuclear war. Such may 
prove the case in this untouched and yet non-politicized part of the globe.  
Some will consider this too rosy a picture to seriously consider and that to trust an 
aggressive Russia would reflect naivety. But this plan does not do away with security at the 
military level completely. As mentioned previously, nations would retain coastal and waterway 
security measures and should be encouraged to do so in the coming decades. As for NATO, it 
will not disappear as it currently stands ready from multiple access points to surge northward if 
necessary. This should not change. A robust response capability is essential as an emergency 
measure, but, as one would not use a fire extinguisher before a fire has begun, such a capability 
would be counterproductive without obvious need. By doing so, cooperation would be less 
coerced and more voluntarily carried out.  
Instead of the military, a policing force should be established. In line with this effort, the 
Arctic Council must reassess its future role. If it chooses to remain an ineffective instrument to 
enforce policies, treaties, and recognized law, then another viable alternative should be 
developed. The Council, however, already provides many qualities making it eminently 
preferable to this secondary option. Its years of activity, rotating chairmanship, entrenched 
policies and legitimacy as a fair and recognized forum for negotiation and problem solving lend 
itself to a larger role. Funding will be necessary and the primary states associated with it must 
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see this as an investment well-made given the potential benefits. Through this central hub of 
authority, policing activity, regulation development, environmental response, and SAR efforts 
can be coordinated and effectively managed within a unique climate. This consistent interchange 
of ideas, representation, and equal footing among other nation-states would be ideal for bringing 
Russia in line with regulations and values associated with the West. By enabling Russia to step 
up to the table and become a part of something larger than itself within a liberal institution, real 
change could be affected.  Such change would likely lead to a warming of relations in other 
matters as well. It is important to remember what Russia has done in the past to invoke the 
distrust of the West, but it is just as important to remember what Russia is currently and how it 
may become a better version of itself if given the chance.  
The Soviet Union existed as a diametrically opposed entity, designed to spread its 
ideology and system of oppression further. There was a time for implacable standoff, but that 
time is not now and this is not the Soviet Union. Putin certainly desires a strong Russia, but that 
is understandable. The breakup of the USSR was humiliating, disruptive and painful in many 
ways. But this, again, provides another opportunity to embrace and not coerce with guns, bombs, 
and jets. Historically, the hard power method has not met with much meaningful success outside 
of blatant conflict. The Arctic does not provide a panacea to the woes associated with Western 
and Russian relations, but the possibility of enabling Russia to take control of its future within 
guidelines it willingly adopts should be seized upon. Russia, secure in a new understanding and 
dynamic, may find a renewed sense of purpose by turning north collaboratively and achieve that 
which it has sought since the early 1990s: a place among equals with real influence, security, and 
standing. The possibility of a way forward promoting liberalism and progressivism while 
achieving ends for all sides is one that the West would be short-sighted to ignore. The 
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recommendations in this paper are not the unequivocal answer to the complicated environment 
within which the world operates today; however, they will surely generate a thought process 
through which we might achieve positive outcomes together as we face regional challenges with 
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